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Abstract We analyze the performance effects of in-season manager changes in Eng-
lish Premier League football during the seasons 2000/2001–2014/2015. We find that
some managerial changes are successful, while others are counterproductive. On
average, performance does not improve following a managerial replacement. The
successfulness of managerial turnover depends on specific highly unpredictable cir-
cumstances, as we illustrate through case-studies.
Keywords Professional football · Manager · Change · Performance
JEL Classification J44 · L83
1 Introduction
Football is very popular worldwide. In Europe and Latin-America, football has enter-
tained crowds for more than one century. In other continents, interest has increased
in the past decades. Top players now move to the football leagues of Australia, Japan
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and the United States, and, more recently, also to the league of the People’s Republic
of China. Both clubs and national associations employ top-class managers from all
around the globe to coach their squads. Furthermore, top clubs have an enormous
global fan base.
The great interest in football is not restricted to fans seeking entertainment. Profes-
sional sports, in general, and professional football, in particular, have proven to be a
fruitful soil for scientific research. Kahn (2000) and Szymanski (2003), for example,
argue that professional sports offer interesting data to analyze labor market phenom-
ena. In this respect, the high frequency of data obtained from controlled events is of
particular interest. Results of football matches, for example, provide a straightforward
and objective measure of performance (Ter Weel 2011). An element in football that
has clear analogies both with business and economics is the ongoing debate about
the effects of management on the performance of firms. Kuper and Szymanski (2010)
question the influence of managers on the performance of professional football teams.
In contrast, Anderson and Sally (2013) argue that this influence is non-negligible, as
leadership appears to matter for history, in general, and for business, in particular.
Pieper et al. (2014) argue, that football managers closely resemble managers in other
branches of the economy with respect to personal characteristics, such as age and the
capabilities to cope with stress, media attention and a large group of stakeholders.
Assuming that ‘management matters’, or, at least, that decision-makers, such as the
supervisory board, suppose that ‘management matters’, one of the key decisions is the
hiring and firing ofmanagers (Ward et al. 2011). This holds in particular, if the decision
to sack a manager is implemented prior to the expiration of her/his contract. Summary
dismissals tend to be rather costly, so that one aims for improved performances in
return. Both Pieper et al. (2014) and Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) show that the
decision to replace a manager is related to the difference between actual performance
and expectations. Both studies use bookmaker odds to derive these expectations. The
authors find an increased probability of replacement, if actual performances fall short
of expectations. Thus, a sequence of (rather) bad results triggers clubs to replace the
manager, hoping for better performances afterwards (Bruinshoofd and terWeel 2003).
Much research has already been done on the effects ofmanager turnover in business.
These studies mainly use stock prices, or data derived from financial statements that
are only published with a lag, viz. on a quarterly or annual basis. These outcomes
point at a statistically significant but small positive effect (Ter Weel 2011). Studies on
the effectiveness of managerial changes in professional football have been done for
a variety of European countries, for example, Belgium, England, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain (see for a recent overview Van Ours and van Tuijl 2016).
Two Belgian studies, Balduck et al. (2010a, b), find no performance effects of a
coach replacement. Studying English football, Poulsen (2000) finds no effects of a
managerial change while Dobson and Goddard (2011) find a negative effect, just after
the replacement of a manager. Analyzing data from German football, Salomo and
Teichmann (2000) find negative effects of a trainer-coach dismissal, while Hentschel
et al. (2012) conclude that a coach change may have a positive effect on homogeneous
teams but no effect for heterogeneous teams. De Paola and Scoppa (2011) find similar
conclusions for Italian football, just like Tena and Forrest (2007) for Spanish football.
Koning (2003), Bruinshoofd and ter Weel (2003), Ter Weel (2011), Van Ours and
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van Tuijl (2016) study the effects of the replacement of head-coaches in the highest
professional football league of the Netherlands. They all find that this does not lead
to better performance of the teams involved.
We study the effects of managerial changes using data of the English Premier
League. We apply the method initially used by Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016). Study-
ing Dutch professional football, they account for potential selectivity of managerial
changes by, first, correcting for the strength of the opponent and, second, by defin-
ing a counterfactual case with a similar development of performances prior to the
hypothetical change, but without the managerial change actually taking place. The
authors use the so-called cumulative surprise as an indicator of the difference between
performance and expectations. The cumulative surprise is the sum of the differences
between the actual number of points and the expected number of points, as based
on bookmaker odds. Then, they use this cumulative surprise to match actual coach
changes to counterfactual observations. In line with most previous studies, Van Ours
and van Tuijl (2016) conclude that the development of performances around the time
of the change in trainer-coach is subject to regression to the mean.
Our main finding is that, on average, an in-season replacement of the manager has
no effect on in-season performances. In addition to the replication of the method of
Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) for the English Premier League, we also investigate
whether there is heterogeneity in the effects and find that some changes have positive
effects, while other changes are counterproductive, i.e. the effects of a managerial
replacement on team performance are negative. To find out whether there is a pattern
in this heterogeneity of the effects of a managerial change, we also study subsamples.
These subsamples are based on the origin of the manager (British vs. non-British), his
age, whether or not the manager ever played for a national team, whether the team
was recently promoted to the Premier League and whether the team finished top-10
or bottom-10 in the preceding season. Our main finding, i.e. managerial replacements
are ineffective, stands up to the scrutiny of these subsamples. To explore potential
differences between successful and unsuccessful managerial changes we present three
case-studies, fromwhichwe conclude that the efficacy ofmanagerial turnover depends
on specific highly unpredictable circumstances.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present our data and our research
method. Subsequently, we discuss our results in Sect. 3. Next, we present three case-
studies in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Data and Set-Up of the Analysis
We use data from English Premier League (EPL) football for 15 seasons, from
2000/2001 to 2014/2015. Every season contains 20 clubs that compete according
to a double round-robin format, resulting in 380 matches per season (5700 matches in
total). For every match, the date, the home team, the away team and the final score are
recorded. Furthermore, the dataset contains match-specific bookmaker data concern-
ing the final result, as well as the managers in charge of the two teams per match.1
1 The bookmaker data stem from William Hill (98%) and from Ladbrokes (2%), in case WH data were
lacking.
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Thus, information on in-season changes is included.2 In case of a managerial change,
we distinguish between forced ‘sackings’ and voluntary ‘resignations’.3 Finally, the
dataset contains information on the final ranks of all clubs within the EPL in the
preceding season.
In our analysis, we consider the first managerial change of a club within a particular
season. Thus we ignore, for example, a caretaker who is replaced after some matches
by a newly hired manager. Consequently, the sample period contains 84 in-season
managerial changes. We follow Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), starting with the
formation of the control group. In order to be a valid counterfactual, an observation
needs to fulfill the following five requirements:
1. The observation concerns the same club, but stems from a different season that
does not contain an in-season change in manager. This excludes two types of
changes. First, we ignore changes that occurred at clubs that only played in the
EPL during just one season in the sample period. Second, we do not take changes
into account at clubs that changed their manager in all of their EPL-seasons in the
sample period.
2. The observation should exhibit a cumulative surprise that does not differ more
than 0.5 from the cumulative surprise at the time of the actual managerial change.
This leads to the exclusion of cases that exhibit a rather large (positive or negative)
cumulative surprise at the time of the change, compared to all other observations.
Applying such a maximum value potentially results in the exclusion of both rather
successful cases and rather unsuccessful cases.4
3. Consistencywith the actual managerial changes requires that we excludematching
with an observation prior to the fifth match and posterior to match 34.
4. For observations that fulfill the first three requirements, we look for the smallest
difference between the rank number of the last match of the replaced manager and
the rank number of the match attached to the potential counterfactual. By doing
so, we assure that matching is also based on the time during the season at which
a change takes place. The closer the rank numbers of the matches, the higher
the likelihood that the pattern towards the change is similar as compared to the
counterfactual. Furthermore, it makes sure that the performances of the treatment
group and the control group have a more or less similar period (i.e. in terms of
the number of matches or observations) to develop, after the treatment has taken
place.
5. In case multiple observations meet all previous requirements, we take as the coun-
terfactual observation the one with the smallest difference in cumulative surprise
as compared to the actual observation.
2 The data on managers has mainly been collected from www.soccerbase.com. In case of missing or
ambiguous information, we have examined newspaper archives and other internet sources.
3 We only consider the first managerial change of a particular club within a particular season. We have
collected information on sackings and resignations from newspaper archives and BBC Sport.
4 Obviously, this value of 0.5 is fairly arbitrary. Yet, an extensive sensitivity analysis has made clear that
different values only lead to a small change in the number of cases to be considered, without altering the
main conclusions.
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Table 1 Descriptives
Season Changes D B A Age C W CS FS MW MCS MFS
00/01 4 3 3 1 45.0 4 19.7 −2.1 −1.1 24.2 −1.8 −2.3
01/02 5 3 5 2 50.6 2 15.0 −2.2 −4.0 15.0 −2.3 −1.7
02/03 2 2 1 0 47.1 2 21.0 −2.6 −9.7 21.5 −2.8 −1.0
03/04 3 2 3 0 46.8 3 14.3 −3.3 −5.0 15.3 −3.1 4.4
04/05 6 2 5 5 55.4 3 11.8 −2.3 −3.4 12.5 −2.3 0.0
05/06 2 2 1 1 50.9 1 18.0 −4.5 1.3 24.5 −4.3 −2.2
06/07 2 2 2 0 41.1 1 25.0 −5.1 −4.6 25.0 −5.2 −1.0
07/08 7 4 6 2 47.9 2 13.1 −4.4 −5.2 13.9 −4.3 0.4
08/09 4 2 3 2 50.1 2 16.2 −2.3 −3.5 13.2 −2.4 −4.7
09/10 4 4 4 3 51.0 1 20.2 −3.2 −3.7 22.5 −3.4 −1.5
10/11 5 4 4 3 52.4 2 16.6 −2.3 −0.8 18.6 −2.5 −5.1
11/12 2 2 1 1 42.7 0 20.0 −6.0 −4.8 21.5 −5.9 −5.0
12/13 4 4 3 2 50.8 2 23.5 −2.0 −1.9 18.7 −2.3 −0.2
13/14 7 6 4 5 49.5 3 17.9 −3.4 −1.5 15.0 −3.6 −2.4
14/15 4 3 3 2 50.7 2 23.0 −2.0 −2.1 23.0 −2.0 −1.6
Total 61 45 48 29 49.6 30 17.5 −3.0 −3.1 17.7 −3.0 −1.5
‘Changes’ indicate the number of changes (all changes included in the analyses) while ‘D’ is the number
of dismissals, ‘B’ the number of British managers, ‘A’ the number of managers aged above 50, ‘Age’ is the
average age at the time of replacement, ‘C’ the number of capped managers, ‘W’ the average number of the
last match of the manager, ‘CS’ the cumulative surprise at the time of replacement, ‘FS’ is the average final
surprise (at the end of the season) for teams that replaced their manager. The ‘M’ in the last three columns
indicate that these values belong to the matched observations
In our sample, ten of themanagerial changes occurred, either prior to the fifthmatch
or posterior to the 34th match. These ten changes will be left out of our analysis. Thus,
74managerial changes remain, of which 13 do notmeet the criteria formatchingwith a
valid counterfactual case to be used in the difference-in-differences approach.Our final
sample thus consists of 61 managerial changes. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
of this sample. It shows, per season and in total, the number of changes to be considered
in our analysis for the complete sample, dismissals only and the subsamples that are
based on managerial characteristics. We define ‘British’ managers as managers from
the United Kingdom and from the Republic of Ireland, thus making a sharp distinction
between these two countries and the rest of the world. For age, we distinguish between
managers aged over 50 andmanagers aged under 50 at the time of replacement. The age
of 50 is the overall average and splits the sample in twomore or less equal subsamples.
Table 1 further shows that managerial replacements, on average, take place around
the middle of the season (columnW) with the cumulative surprise then being negative
(column CS). Column FS shows the average cumulative surprise at the end of the
season, indicating that, for some seasons we find improvements, while for others the
cumulative surprise decreases. The last three columns show the average values for
our counterfactual observations. By definition, the values for the rank number of the
match and for cumulative surprise are rather similar for the treatment and control group.
However, the improvement in cumulative surprise is larger for the control group than
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Fig. 1 Kernel density cumulative surprise for types of managerial changes; final match of the season
for the treatment group, given the values for MFS and FS. Table 5 in the Appendix
presents a detailed overview including all single managerial changes.
We estimate the parameters of the following linear model using OLS:
yi jk = ηik + r ′i jkβ + δdi jk + λci jk + εi jk, (1)
where yi jk is the performance indicator, i denotes the club, j indicates the match and k
refers to the season. We use the number of points as performance indicator.5 Note that
we investigate in-season replacements and performances. Therefore, we include club-
season fixed-effects ηik , which account for unobserved elements such as the quality of
a team in a particular season. Home advantage is highly relevant for the performance
[see for exampleVan Ours and van Tuijl (2016)]. Consequently, a dummy is included
that has value one for matches played at home. Evidently, the quality of the opponent
is also important. This strength is proxied by the final rank in the previous season.6
The latter two variables are both included in the vector r ′i jk , while β represents the
vector of parameter estimates and εi jk is the error term. The focus of our analysis is
on two variables. First, di jk is a dummy for the treatment group, with value one if a
manager has been replaced and δ measuring the effect of the managerial change on
the performance. Second, ci jk is a dummy for the control group, with value one if
the ‘hypothetical’ change has taken place and with λ measuring the counterfactual
effect on the performance. An F-test for the equality of δ and λ reveals whether the
managerial change exerts influence on the in-season performance. First, we estimate
the parameters of Eq. (1) using our complete sample. Then, we estimate the relevant
parameters for dismissals only.
Figure 1 shows kernel densities for the cumulative surprises at the end of the season
for the subsets of dismissals, resignations, as well as for the majority of the cases,
5 Alternatively, we used victory (whether a team has won the match) and goal difference as performance
indicators. Then, our main findings are identical.
6 Promoted teams are all assigned rank 20.
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in which no managerial change has taken place. The distribution of the cumulative
surprise for the dismissals is somewhat different from the distribution of the cumulative
surprise for quits. Nevertheless, they look fairly similar. However, there is a clear
difference between the seasons with a managerial change compared to the seasons
without a managerial change. At the end of the latter seasons there is a more positive
cumulative surprise. In other words, seasons withmanagerial changes are seasons with
worse performance than seasons without a managerial change.
3 Parameter Estimates
In analyzing the effectiveness of in-season manager replacements, we first use all 61
changes for which we have found a valid counterfactual. Then, we focus on the sub-
set of dismissals. The parameter estimates for all managerial changes are presented
in the first column of Table 2. ‘Rank Opponent’ is a measure of the strength of the
opponent, while ‘Home’ represents home advantage. The variable ‘Manager change’
measures the difference in performance before and after a managerial change.Without
taking a control group into account, we can interpret the coefficients of this variable as
treatment effects. A significant positive value indicates that performances improved,
suggesting that changes were effective. However, interpreting this result as causal
would be wrong, since one does not take into account the situation in which the man-
ager would not have been replaced. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for the
control group reflectingmanagerial replacement that did not take place. Significant and
positive values for the related parameter indicate that performances went up after the
‘counterfactual’ change, i.e. the matched observation. The F-test for equality between
the two managerial-change parameter shows whether there is indeed a causal effect,
i.e. if the two parameters are not significantly different from each other there is no
treatment effect. Table 2 also shows the number of observations in the treatment and
Table 2 Parameter estimates determinants team performance
All changes Dismissals
Rank opponent 0.05 (0.00)*** 0.05 (0.00)***
Home 0.56 (0.04)*** 0.55 (0.04)***
Manager change 0.21 (0.05)*** 0.28 (0.05)***
Counterfactual manager change 0.21 (0.06)*** 0.26 (0.06)***





Team performance is measured by the number of points per match. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All estimates include club-season fixed effects. ‘Rank opponent’ refers to the rank of the opponent in the
preceding season. ‘Home’ indicates whether a match was played at home
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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control groups, both separately and combined. Differences in the number of obser-
vations between the treatment and control groups arise because some club-season
combinations are a control group for multiple treatment groups.
Interpreting Table 2, while focusing on the results for all changes, we observe that
both the strength of the opponent as well as the home advantage are highly significant.
They both have the expected sign. The weaker the opponent, the better the outcome,
while home matches also result in better results. Furthermore, we find a highly signif-
icant and positive coefficient for a managerial change. Our naïve conclusion would be
that a change in manager is successful on average. However, we find similar results
and comparable values for the counterfactual managerial change. The F-test indeed
shows that there is no significant difference between the treatment and control group.
The results thus show that the improvement in performance after the change in man-
ager (i.e. the treatment group) would also have occurred if the manager would have
kept his position (i.e. the control group). On average, we do not find a causal relation
between performances and the managerial changes. This finding is in line with the
results of previous studies and in particular comparable to the results found by Van
Ours and van Tuijl (2016).
The findings for dismissals are fairly similar. These results are presented in the sec-
ond column of Table 2. Leaving out the 16 resignations, thus analyzing 45 dismissals,
results in comparable values, significance and conclusions. In general, thus, we may
conclude that there is no point in firing a manager after a sequence of bad results,
since performances would have improved irrespective of the manager in charge.7
Again, these results are in line with previous studies.
Table 3 shows the results for multiple subsamples which are based on the char-
acteristics of the replaced manager.8 In the first and second column, we distinguish
between British (n = 48) and non-British (n = 13) coaches.9 Column three and four
contain the results for subsamples of coaches aged over 50 (n = 29) and aged under
50 (n = 32), at the time they were replaced. Finally, the last two columns, five and
six, report the results for those coaches who were capped as an active player (n = 30)
and those who did not play for their country (n = 31). Without going into detail, the
general result is that we find significant improvements in performance after a manage-
rial change, which is also the case for the counterfactual managerial change. However,
we do not find any significant differences between treatment group and control group.
This leads us to conclude that on average, for none of the subsamples, performances
improve after a managerial change.
7 It would bemore accurate to formulate ‘after a sequence of results below expectations’, which emphasizes
that clubs (probably) take into account the heterogeneity of opponents and the order of play in their decision
to fire a manager. From Table 5 in the Appendix it becomes clear that the cumulative surprise at the moment
of the managerial replacement is negative for most cases.
8 Note that for each group of two subsamples (i.e. British, Age and Capped) the total number of treatment
groups is 61 and equal to the number for all changes in Table 2. However, the total number control groups
might be different and in particular higher than the number of 45 in Table 2, since a club-season that is a
counterfactual for multiple treatment groups is counted only once in Table 2, but twice if it belongs to both
subsamples per group in Table 3.
9 As mentioned above, we define ‘British’ managers as managers from either the United Kingdom or from
the Republic of Ireland.
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344 L. M. Besters et al.
Finally, Table 4 presents the results for three subsamples that are based on the rank
of the team in preceding year. The latter functions as a crude indicator of the quality
and status of a club.10 In columns one and two, we distinguish between clubs that
were promoted in the previous season from the second tier of English football, the
Championship, to the Premier League. Three teams were promoted in each season
during the sample period, resulting in eight treatment groups to be considered, com-
pared to 53 non-promoted teams. Extending the definition of promotion to one of the
two preceding seasons, the number of treatment cases increases to 13, while 48 then
belong to the non-promoted category. The results for these subsamples are presented
in the third and fourth column. The last two columns provide results for subsamples
where we distinguish between clubs that finished in the top half (n = 23) and in the
bottom half (n = 38) of the Premier League table in the preceding season, treating
promoted teams as part of the bottom. In contrast to the results in the Tables 2 and
3, we now find some insignificant values. The coefficient for the treatment group of
the promoted teams in the preceding season (column 1) is positive, but insignificant,
meaning that, for this subsample of cases, performances did not improve after the
change in manager.
Interestingly, the coefficient for the control group is positive and significant, but the
F-test for equality reveals that there is no significant difference between the treatment
and control groups, which might have to do with the small number of observations
in this subsample. The other insignificant results are found for the top half of the
league table (column 5). Here, both coefficients for the treatment and control group
are positive, but insignificant, strengthening the idea that, for this subset of club-season
combinations, performances develop irrespective of themanager in charge. The F-test
reveals no significant difference, which is also the case for all other subsamples that
do contain positive and significant results.
4 Case Studies of Managerial Replacements
Our results in the previous section reveal that, on average, performances improve
after the replacement of a manager, but the improvement is not causally related to
the change. This is in line with previous studies. Nevertheless, there is a clear hetero-
geneity in the effects of a managerial change when we look at individual managerial
changes. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of all 61 changes included in our sample.
The horizontal axis refers to the change in cumulative surprise after the managerial
replacement. The vertical axis indicates the change in cumulative surprise for the con-
trol group.11 For the sake of clarity, we added a diagonal that indicates equality of
equal change in cumulative surprise for the treatment group and the control group.
Observations above the line represent cases in which the control group did better than
10 The same remark about the number of treatment groups and the number of control groups made for
Table 3 (footnote 8) applies to Table 4.
11 Since the cumulative surprise at the managerial change and the cumulative surprise at the counterfactual
event does not exceed 0.5, we compare the change in cumulative surprise for both events. The values are
calculated from Table 5 by taking FS–CS for the treatment group and MFS–MCS for the control group.
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346 L. M. Besters et al.
Fig. 2 Development of cumulative surprise for all individual treatments and matched counterfactuals
the treatment group, suggesting that the changewas ineffective or even counterproduc-
tive. Observations below the line represent cases in which the managerial change was
effective. Furthermore, the closer the observations are to the line, the more equal the
development of the two groups is. Many observations are fairly close to the diagonal,
which suggests that the managerial change was ineffective, thus supporting our aver-
age result. However, a substantial number of observations are at a fairly large distance
from the diagonal, suggesting that some changes are quite effective, while others are
counterproductive.
To investigate whether there are particular reasons for effectiveness or ineffective-
ness of a managerial change, we selected three managerial replacements to discuss
in more detail. First, we look at Chelsea FC, with treatment season 2011/2012 and
counterfactual 2010/2011. This observation is indicated as a ‘diamond’ in Fig. 2. The
close proximity of the ‘diamond’ towards the diagonal line suggests hardly any effect
at all. Second, we discuss Leeds United FC, with treatment season 2003/2004 and
counterfactual 2000/2001. This observation is indicated as a ‘triangle’ in Fig. 2. The
position of the ‘triangle’ suggests a strongly negative effect. Third, we examine New-
castle United FC, with treatment season 2005/2006 and counterfactual 2012/2013.
This observation is indicated as a ‘circle’ in Fig. 2. The position of the ‘circle’
suggests a substantially positive effect. All three cases concern the dismissal of the
manager.
4.1 Chelsea FC
André Villas-Boas moved from FC Porto to Chelsea FC in the summer of 2011.12
The Portuguese manager, only 33 years old at the time, had just guided the ‘Dragões’
12 The information in this subsection stems from the articles concerning Chelsea FC seasons in Wikipedia.
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(Dragons) to victory in the UEFA Europa League. Rumour has it that the London club
paid a transfer fee of approximately 15 million euro. Villas-Boas soon presented a
3-year plan to take the London club to the top of Europe. Yet, Chelsea-owner Roman
Abramovich had already run out of patience after little more than 8months. The
Russian club-owner held the manager responsible for the disappointing results. Thus,
on 4 March, 2012, Chelsea FC sacked their Portuguese manager. Former Italian mid-
fielder Roberto Di Matteo, previously an assistant to Villas-Boas, took over, initially
only as a caretaker. At the end of the season, Chelsea were sixth in the table. However,
Di Matteo guided them to their first ever victory in the UEFA Champions League
(UCL). Moreover, Chelsea also won the FA Cup under his supervision.13
Carlo Ancelotti became the Chelsea FC manager in the summer of 2009. The
former Italian midfielder had guided ACMilan to two UCL-victories (2003, 2007). In
the 2009/2010 season, he led Chelsea to the double, viz. both the EPL and the FA Cup.
However, Chelsea lost both prizes in the next season. Abramovich sacked Ancelotti
immediately posterior to the last match of the 2010/2011 season. One month earlier,
rivals Manchester United FC had eliminated Chelsea FC in the quarter finals of the
UCL, a trophy then still absent in the club’s boardroom. This has probably been a
crucial element underlying this post-season sacking.
Figure 2 immediately makes clear that the difference between the control season
(2010/2011) and the treatment season (2011/2012) is negligible.Moreover, the decline
in cumulative surprise after the (hypothetical) change in manager is about equal for
both seasons (see Fig. 3a). The efforts that resulted in winning two trophies probably
explain the disappointing results in the EPL in the treatment season, despite replacing
the manager, who apparently was a mismatch. After all, the importance of the FA Cup
may have decreased in the twentyfirst century, but the UCL is, no doubt, the biggest
prize in European club football.
4.2 Leeds United FC (LUFC)
In the 2003/2004 season, the debts of LeedsUnited FCwere assessed as astronomically
high, at around 100million pound sterling.14 Consequently, LUFC had to go on selling
quality players,weakening their squad. The board sackedmanager Peter Reid, a former
England international midfielder, on 10 November 2003, a fewmonths after his arrival
at Elland Road. At that time, LUFC had gained nomore than eight points from a dozen
EPL matches. Eddy Gray, an all-time club-hero, took over as a caretaker. Initially, the
results got better under his supervision: LUFC even moved out of the danger zone
at the end of 2003. However, they subsequently lost seven matches in a row. Yet, the
‘Whites’ succeeded in bouncing back a little, one more time. However, in the end,
relegation was inevitable.
13 Chelsea FC sacked Roberto di Matteo on 21 November 2012, after Italian champions Juventus FC had
eliminated them from the 2012/2013 UCL.
14 The information in this subsection stems from the articles concerning Leeds United FC seasons in
Wikipedia.
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Fig. 3 Case studies. a Chelsea
FC, treatment season 11/12,
control season 10/11. b Leeds
United FC, treatment season
03/04, control season 00/01. c
Newcastle United FC, treatment
season 05/06, control season
12/13
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David O’Leary was in charge at Elland Road from 1 October 1998, when he suc-
ceeded his former boss George Graham, until the summer of 2002. At that time, the
board sacked him. O’Leary had been allowed to spend more than 100 million pound
sterling in the transfer market, without winning any trophy. O’Leary’s team seri-
ously dipped during the 2000/2001 season, but they recovered. These plunges may be
ascribed to the lagged fatigue effects and leading anticipation effects of UCLmatches,
at least partly. In April 2001, LUFC reached the semi-finals of the UCL/European
Champions’ Cup for the first time since 1975.
Figure 2 makes clear that the difference between the control season (2000/2001)
and the treatment season (2003/2004) is positive. Moreover, Fig. 3b demonstrates that
the cumulative surprise developed unfavourably after the managerial change in the
2003/2004 season as compared to the same period in the control season.
4.3 Newcastle United FC (NUFC)
Newcastle United FC experienced a turbulent summer in 2005.15 Rumours concerning
the club-ownership, the departure of some star-players and the failure to qualify for
Europe via the UEFA Intertoto cup (UIC) all contributed to the turmoil. Meanwhile,
the Scottish manager Graeme Souness, a former Liverpool FC-hero, bought some
first-class players, including England striker Michael Owen, who returned to England
for 17 million pound sterling, after one season at Real Madrid.
Initially, Owen nicely co-operated with Alan Shearer, the latter in his final season as
an active player. However, Owen got seriously injured on New Year’s Eve. After that,
the form of the team decreased severely. One month later, the NUFC board sacked
Souness. A stiff battle against relegation then seemed to lie ahead for the ‘Magpies’.
The 2005/2006 season then seemed to lack any prospect for the ‘Magpies’. Glenn
Roeder, director of the youth academy, took over as caretaker. He guided the team
from the fifteenth place to the seventh place, thus even capturing an UIC spot. The
team won no less than nine matches out of the remaining 14 matches in the EPL. Irish
national goalkeeper Given and Shearer uttered afterwards that Souness had never been
a fans’ favourite and that his preference for certain players had been devastating for the
team spirit. However, injuries had also been a crucial element in their dipping form.
In the 2012/2013 season Alan Pardew guided NUFC to the 16th place. Thus, they
avoided relegation. In the FA Cup and in the Football League Cup, they only lasted
one round. However, NUFC did reach the quarter finals of the UEFA Europa League,
which might explain their disappointing performance in the EPL and the domestic cup
competitions, at least partly.
The chemistry between Souness and part of the team had apparently gone during
the treatment season (2005/2006). Moreover, the mighty fans of the ‘Magpies’ did
not appreciate his work. Under such circumstances, the replacement of a manager
may be an inevitable measure. During the control season (2012/2013), NUFC were
mediocre in all three domestic competitions. This may be explained from huge Euro-
15 The information in this subsection stems from the articles concerning Newcastle United FC seasons in
Wikipedia.
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pean efforts. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the difference between the treatment
season (2005/2006) and the control season (2012/2013) is positive, as Fig. 2 makes
clear. Furthermore, Fig. 3c demonstrates the cumulative surprise developed favourably
after the managerial change in the 2005/2006 season as compared to the same period
in the control season.
5 Concluding Remarks
In English premier league football managers are replaced for various reasons, but pre-
dominantly because of poor performance (Audas et al. 1999; Dobson and Goddard
2011; Bachan et al. 2008; d’Addona and Kind 2014).16 In our paper, we investi-
gate the effectiveness of in-season manager replacements, using data of 15 seasons
from English Premier League football. When we compare the change in performance
after managerial replacements with the change in performance of counterfactual
replacements we find no difference. Although we find heterogeneity in the effects
of managerial changes, the successfulness seems to be related to specific and highly
unpredictable circumstances. This raises the question why managers are dismissed
anyway. There are several potential reasons for this. The first possible reason is that
some club-owners are good in recognizing that a managerial replacement might be
effective, while other club-owners are not. The second possible reason is misper-
ception. As performance after a managerial change is often better than before, the
perception is that this change was successful. True or not, club-owners are probably
not interested in counterfactuals. A before–after comparison without considering a
counterfactual is misleading from a researchers’ point of view, but not in the percep-
tion of club-owners, fans and mass-media. The third possible reason is asymmetry in
the perception of the relationship between decision and result. Deciding for a replace-
ment and not have an improvement in results is better than deciding not to act and
not have an improvement in results. In the first case, club-owners have at least tried
to improve the performance, in the second case they failed to act. The fourth possible
reason is that dismissal is simply the destiny of a manager. The position of a manager
has once been invented such that a manager gets the blame for disappointing results
and not the club-owner (Carter 2006, 2007).
Thus, managers seem to be sacked due to reasons outside of their influence, func-
tioning as scapegoats. In management literature this is found to be the case after
bad performances (e.g. Khanna and Poulsen 1995) and might be an optimal strategy,
together with the appointment of an outside successor, in the aftermath of wrong-
doing (Gangloff et al. 2016). In sports, scapegoating of managers is found as well
(e.g. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel 2003). Consequently, their jobs are highly uncertain.
The saying “you’re only as good as your last match” seems to be typically true for
professional football managers. Therefore, they will ask for some compensation in
return for this uncertainty. However, many qualified managers are available, who are
all willing to work in the EPL. This makes it rather easy for clubs to find a suitable
16 See Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) for determinants of coach replacement in other European football
leagues.
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replacement. Therefore, onemight expectmarginal demands from their side. Although
CEO-compensation is based on multiple factors, such as ability (Chang et al. 2010),
the opposite seems to be true, as salaries seem to be sky-high, probably including a
scapegoat premium as found by Ward et al. (2011) for the CEO of listed companies
as well as for college American football coaches. We have found that performances
develop irrespective of the manager in charge, which is in line with the doubts of
Kuper and Szymanski (2010) about the influence of football manager. Apparently,
extremely high salaries reflect the compensation for job uncertainty rather than the
compensation for superior quality.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Details on the Data
Table 5 provides an overview of the 61 valid matched observations. Besides informa-
tion on the seasons, match rank-numbers and managers, the columns CS and MCS
report the matched values of cumulative surprise which, by definition, do not differ
more than 0.5. Interestingly, we do observe some (large) differences when comparing
thefinal two columns that report the cumulative surprises at the end of the season.Adif-
ference between these two values might indicate a positive (or negative) development
of performances after the replacement of the manager compared to the counterfactual.
We would like to note that we compare surprises based on expectations obtained from
bookmaker odds. If these odds are heavily based on recent in-season results, badly
(well) performing teams are likely to face low (high) expectations, which would over-
estimate (underestimate) their performance in terms of surprise. Then, the cumulative
surprise is probably not a good performance measure to evaluate the effectiveness of
in-season coach changes, since clubs are only interested in the actual number of points
obtained. We indeed use this as the main performance measure in our analyses. How-
ever, we question the focus on recent in-season performances by bookmakers, given
the broad range of cumulative surprises. The cumulative surprise is a useful measure
to compare performances between different clubs and seasons.
Table 5 also provides information on some characteristics of the replaced manager,
i.e. his nationality (column N), in particular, whether he has a British nationality, his
age (column A) at the moment of replacement and the number of caps as a player
(column C). We define ‘British’ managers as managers from the United Kingdom
and from the Republic of Ireland, thus making a sharp distinction between these two
countries and the rest of the world. Finally, column T reports whether the change was
a dismissal or a quit.
Table 6 shows the 23 managerial changes that we have excluded from the analysis.
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